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IRWIN FRIEND
Department of Commerce
This conference reflects some of the more notable shifts in emphasis in the
study of business finance, from a description of financial structures and
standards to-an analysis of their rationale, and from the viewpoint of entre-
preneurs and investors to that of the economy as a whole. Particular
attention has been paid to the role of business finance in facilitating the
flow of investment, presumably in a manner best designed to foster eco-
nomic growth and stability. The broad economic implications of practically
all the important aspects of business finance have been touched on,
admittedly not resolved, including the relation of internal financing to the
problem of allocation of resources, and the relation of debt financing to
cyclical stability.
Though the conference has produced a number of valuable papers, it
see•i-ns to me to highlight the absence of reliable data and satisfactory theory
in this field. As indicated by some of the contributors, recent progress has
been noteworthy; but it has also been slow. It is interesting that a high
proportion of the discussion in these papers is devoted to objectives of
research and a recommended program of future work rather than to
present accomplishment. - -
Ihad originally intended to confine most of my comments to sugges-
tions for further research, but I find that this area has to a considerable
extent been dealt with. I shall therefore concentrate my attention on sum-
marizing, occasionally taking issue with, and supplementing on a selective
basis, some of the substantive material presented at this conference, at-
tempting not to duplicate the remarks made by the discussants of the
individual papers. In the process, I hope to underline briefly some of the
needs for new data and additional studies.
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HISTORICAL SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS,
BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUPS
The first paper, by Loughlin F. McHugh, represents a progress report of
work on sources and uses of funds of business corporations from 1926 to
date which was initiated at the Department of Commerce more than two
years ago, together with a presentation of some tentative results. Data for
the postwar period were completed in 1948 and have been published
regularly time. Work on the prewar estimates, however, has been
intermittent and progress quite slow. It is hoped that they will be completed
in the forthcoming year.
The principal bodies of information which are being utilized in esti-
mating the historical sources and uses of funds include Bureau of Internal
Revenue Statistics of Income data, adjusted for varying coverage, industry
shifts, changes in degree of consolidation, and known peculiarities of
reporting; Department of Commerce national income and product statis-
tics; Securities and Exchange Commission and Commerce plant and equip-
ment expenditure data; Federal Reserve Board plant and equipment
expenditures data; SEC, Federal Trade Commission and FRB corporate
balance sheet and profit and loss data; SEC net issue data; Chronicle net
issue data (adjusted); banking and other financial data; special studies of
government and private research agencies, such as the National Bureau of
Economic Research; and sample company reports. Statistics of income
data alone are, of course, not adequate even for the period they cover,
since the fixed asset and securities figures are greatly affected by revaluation
and since many of the desired breakdowns of other items are not available.
In tracing the flow of funds received and disbursed by business con-
cerns, the sources of funds should be equal to their uses. There are, how-
ever, several reasons for discrepancies in these over-all estimates of the
sources and uses of funds, totally apart from errors in estimation. First of
all, the money received by corporations —largelyfrom unincorporated
business —representingan excess of sales over purchases of used plant and
equipment is not reflected in these statistics. Second, transactions in securi-
ties held as permanent investments, i.e., as noncurrent assets, are not cov-
ered except where there is a public offering. Third, net new issues, i.e., new
security issues less retirements, do not include entrepreneurial capital used
in setting up new corporations where there is no offering or sale of securi-
ties to the public or to institutions. The liquidation of such corporations
similarly is not reflected.
These deficiencies, it should be noted, do not appear to be particularly
significant in the postwar years, though for the prewar period they are more
troublesome. In the late twenties, for example, transactions by corpora-SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL 319
tions in securities held as "permanent" investments were quite substantial.,
Moreover, prior to 1933, the SEC data on net security issues —newissues
less retirements —didnot exist. In the prewar years generally, estimated
uses of funds are somewhat larger than estimated sources, a fact which
may reflect the systematic errors previously noted, or else imply either an
understatement of retained profits or an underestimation of net issues. In
the postwar period the discrepancies are quite small, especially in the two
years for which complete Statistics of Income data are available.
It should be pointed out that one of the most bothersome items in the
current series on sources and uses of funds lies in the estimates of net
issues obtained from the SEC, though the latter are much better than any-
thing else available in the field. While (as will be discussed in some detail
in a forthcoming monograph') there does not appear to be any substantial
error in the current estimates of total net issues, a downward bias is appar-
ent in the estimates both of new issues and retirements. There seems to be
an upward bias in the estimates of net bond issues, and a downward bias
in the estimate of net stock issues..
If the data on net issues were expanded conceptually to include entre-
preneurial capital flowing into and out of corporations where no public
offering is involved, the present SEC figures would probably prove to be
somewhat too low, on the average, in prosperous years, while the reverse
is most likely true in depressed periods. Shifts in legal status introduce a
special problem; conceptually these could also be reflected in net issues,
though it seems to me that it might be preferable if data were available to
handle them separately as capital transfers. It may be noted in this connec-
tion that the relationship of corporate to individual tax rates has an effect
on the direction of the bias in estimating the flow of capital into or out of
the corporate sphere. Thus, with the imposition of the corporate excess
profits tax in the early part of World War II many closely held corporations
switched to a noncorporate status, while a reverse movement took place
after the war, with the disappearance of this particular tax.
It should. be emphasized that there is no satisfactory figure of census or
universe proportions available either for new issues or retirements. It
would be relatively simple and highly desirable to obtain the necessary
information by appending an appropriate schedule to the federal corporate
income tax form. In lieu of such a procedure, reasonably satisfactory data
of this nature may eventually be obtained on a sample basis through the
joint Federal Trade Commission-Securities and Exchange Commission
financial reporting program.
The Volume and Composition of Individuals' Saving, by Irwin Friend with the
assistance of Vito Natrella.320 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
For the period prior to 1926, when Statistics of Income data and many
of the other sources of information were not available, it becomes progres-
sively more difficult if not impossible to piece together a complete sources
and uses of funds account for the entire corporate economy. However, as
Sidney Alexander indicated, it is possible from data for a sample of
corporations and other scattered financial materials to draw some signifi-
cant conclusions about trends in the financing of capital requirements in
the 1900-1926 period. One observation that may be worth adding is that
though reasOnably satisfactory series on external equity financing do not
predate the first World War, it is possible to set down some meaningful
propositions about such financing even prior to that period.
For example, a general knowledge of financial history suggests that
prior to the early part of this century, equity securities were completely
negligible as a form of business financing. People who talk of .the low level
of outside equity financing in the postwar period in relation to some histori-
cal perspective probably have in mind a very short period in our history,
the boom years of the late twenties. Some may, of course, be referring to
the purported greater willingness of the more affluent members of the com-
munity, in the indeterminate past, to make funds available to a. prospective
entrepreneur on a partnership basis —apoint which it is extremely difficult
either to prove or disprove.
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS BY SIZE OF FIRM
AND FOR NEW BUSINESSES
The papers by Charles Schmidt and Lawrence Bridge summarize the avail-
able data on sources and uses of funds by size of firm and for new busi-
nesses. Apart from reviewing past studies in this field, Mr. Schmidt
presents the results of an attempt to derive a sources and uses of funds
analysis for small manufacturing corporations in 1946 on the basis of
Statistics of Income data, and for small manufacturing corporations in the
year ending March 31, 1949 on the basis of the relatively new FTC-SEC
data. As he points out, neither series yields satisfactory results.
With Mr. Schmidt's conclusion —thatin. their presently published
form Statistics of Income data are not suitable for purposes of estimating
sources and uses of corporate funds by size of firm —Itend to agree. It
should be pointed out, however, that 1946 maybe a particularly atypical
year for such a comparison in view of the unprecedented number of new
firms entering the business population and the substantial magnitude of
the shifts from noncorporate to corporate status as a result of repeal of
the excess profits tax. On the other hand, an excess of capital and earned
surplus over gross retained profits for such firms may actually haveSUMMARY AND APPRAISAL 321
reduced the excess of sources over uses as calculated by Mr. Schmidt.
Nevertheless, I still think that it 'might be worthwhile to extend the type of
analysis• indicated for 1946 to other years in an attempt to determine the
reasons for variations between sources and uses in different periods.
Mr. Schmidt's appraisal of the utility of the SEC-FTC series for
sources and uses of funds analysis by size of firm seems to me questionable.
I see little reason to conclude that since the quarterly samples in these
series are not constant, the data are of little use in sources and uses of
funds analysis unless the sampling procedure is changed, and that as a
consequence consideration should be given to initiation of a new series.
A very high proportion of the 6,000 or so manufacturing corporations in
this sample are identical from quarter to quarter, and there does not seem
to be any intrinsic reason why data for those firths could not be blown up
separately. In fact, cost and other considerations involved in deriving a
comparable sample of this magnitude would seem to dictate such an
approach.
Mr. Schmidt's comprehensive review of income, balance sheet, and
sources and uses of funds statements available for analyzing the effects of
business size on investment and its financing should be supplemented by
reference to sources of available data which relate to individual items in a
sources and uses analysis. One of the best known is the Federal Reserve
System's survey of business loans of member banks as of November 30,
1946, which collected data on the number, value, interest rates and col-
lateral on outstanding short-term and long-term loans by size of borrower
as well as by industry, region, and, to a limited extent, date of organization
of borrower.
Not so well known, but of considerable interest, are the SEC studies
—bothpublished and unpublished —ofthe relative flotation costs of
security issues of small and large corporations. Research workers cus-
tomarily think of the SEC as a source of data invaluable for large corpo-
rations but of little utility for small firms. Though such an impression
obviously is not without foundation, the Commission does have a great
mass of useful data on Regulation A issues, i.e., issues less than $300,000
in size, a good deal of which is public information. There have also been
several fairly comprehensive, unpublished studies on the characteristics
of such issues, including size of issue; types of securities and methods of
offering; size, industry, location and age of issuer; extent of proposed
distribution; financial data available on the issuer; and market after issu-
ance —aswell as on their sales success and costs of flotation. Though not
too large amounts of such securities were ever offered, it is interesting to
note that in the immediate postwar years when the stock market was'322 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
and business booming, the proportion of offerings sold was quite high, in
contrast to the very small proportion sold in the immediate prewar period.
One other comment I might make in connection with Mr. Schmidt's
paper is that the absence of data on the sources and uses of funds by
of firm makes much more difficult the interpretation of trends in the over-
all sources and uses of funds for all size groups combined. Thus the
substantial decline in the over-all ratio of dividends to net earnings for
corporations as a whole from the 1920's to the postwar period might
conceivably indicate a greater reluctance to undertake new financing as a
result of increased difficulties or expense; or it may reflect an additional
incentive to retain earnings in view of the much higher current individual
income tax rate. The smaller and more closely held companies would be
particularly subject to the latter incentive, and it is interesting to note that
for the stocks of large companies that are widely held, there does not seem
to have been as much of a decline in the ratio of net earnings
from the twenties to the present as is indicated by the data for corporations
as a whole.
Similarly, fluctuations over time in items like aggregate business inven-
tories and liquid assets, in relation to such explanatory variables as sales
and current liabilities, cannot be satisfactorily explained without data by
size of firm. For example, inventory analysts are aware that while, for a
given level of activity, aggregate trade inventories declined in relation to
sales from the 1920's to the 193 0's —presumablyreflecting some increase
in efficiency —thisis not true of manufacturing inventories. One reason
which might be given for the, apparent secular stability of inventory turn-
over in manufacturing is that an increase in vertical integration —which
lowers sales more than it does inventories —wascounteracted by increases
in efficiency. Another possibility is that such increases in efficiency were
offset by a drop over this period in the relative importance of small manu-
facturing firms which, perhaps as a reflection of financing difficulties, have
comparatively high inventory turnover. Not only are there significant
differences in the financial characteristics and behavior of small as com-
pared to large firms, but there are also important secular and cyclical
variations in the relative importance of the two groups.
The main body of the paper by Mr. Bridge summarizes the results of
the first reasonably comprehensive survey of the sources and disposition
of initial funds invested in new firms. This relatively new material, cover-
ing the postwar period, was developed during the past two years in the
Department of Commerce. Some of the difficulties and limitations charac-
teristic of such a survey are described both in Mr. Bridge's paper and in
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length by the discussants. Specific mention was made of the desirability
obtaining life span data as against the new versus established firm break-
down. It was pointed out in this connection that some work in this area is
currently proceeding at the Department of Commerce.
The high proportion of initial investment financed by the personal
saving of entrepreneurs shown by the Commerce survey, the moderate
amount furnished by banks, and the insignificant proportion financed by
the capital markets are not entirely surprising, though these data furnish
the first reliable indications of the magnitudes involved. More surprising,
perhaps, is the substantial size of the contribution of new firms to aggregate
business outlays on plant and equipment and inventories. The period cov-
ered is, of course, unusual in this respect. It might be interesting, however,
to apply the average investment of new firms indicated by the survey,
adjusted for price level and possibly other differences, to the historical
data on the business population in order to determine the impact of such
firms on the business cycle.
Mr. Oxenfeldt laid great stress on the fact that investment by new firms
might very well have been carried out by existing firms in the absence of
competition furnished by the newcomers. No one would disagree with this
general statement, but I would like to see some analysis of the cyclical
timing and magnitude of inventory investment of new as compared with
existing firms. Presumably new firms require a certain minimum volume
of inventories before they can start operations, and even the same aggregate
volume of sales would necessitate larger over-all inventories, at least
initially, as a result of the increase in the number of firms in the business
population.
Mr. Bridge also mentions several related studies now in the planning
stage at the Department of Commerce. Among other objectives, these
studies are intended to investigate financing difficulties of new and estab-
lished firms not reflected in the actual data on sources of funds obtained,
and the relationship of size of initial investment and form of financing, as
as of nonfinancial factors, to the subsequent experience of new firms..
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEMAND FOR FUNDS BY BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES, AND THE PROBLEM OF FORECASTING
BUSINESS CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
In their analysis of problems and procedures in projecting business capital
requirements, Edgar M. Hoover and Burton H. Klein discuss various sta-
tistical methods for estimating future requirements, with special emphasis
on projections of fixed capital investment and profits. They consider from
several different points of view the estimation of a "sustainable" level of324 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FiNANCE
investment associated with an assumed volume of over-all economic activ-
ity —particularlyunder conditions of stable full employment; the amount
of expected profits under such assumed conditions, and the adequacy of
expected profits from an investment incentives standpoint.
Because the discussion is in very general terms, with little indication of
the quantitative differences implicit in the various possible assumptions
and procedures, the paper may tend to give the impression that even with
all the limitations of our knowledge it is possible to derive a reasonably
close estimate of a "sustainable" level of investment in year 195x which
is consistent with the expected level of profits. Even if we were to accept
for purposes of the argument any projected level of profits, it seems to me
that attention should be called to the widely disparate results obtained by
deriving a norm for sustainable plant and equipment expenditures in rela-
tion to private gross national product on the basis of dollar values on the
one hand, and real or deflated values on the other; or a norm for investment
incentives on the basis of lagged profits before taxes, as compared with the
implications of lagged profits after taxes. It may be unnecessary to point out
that the periods and relationships used in obtaining the norms also have
a considerable effect on the results.
There are two other related points that may be worth raising in connec-
tion with the paper by Messrs. Hoover and Klein. First, in discussing
sustainable rates of investment, they mention the finding that business
expenditures for new equipment showed a steadily rising trend of 3 percent
per year (in 1929 prices) between 1869 and 1929, and they critically
appraise some conclusions that have been drawn from that fact. Actually,
the finding appears to be incorrectly quoted in the secondary source to
which they refer. The trend rise from 1869 to 1898 seems to have been
over 5percent,from 1899 to 1929 close to 4percent,and only by 1929
down to 3 percent, according to the original data. I should like to add that
if instead of 1929 prices, 1914 prices were used, the rise in such "real" or
deflated terms from 1899 to 1929 would have been 5½ratherthan 4per-
cent yearly. Though differences of this magnitude may not normally occur,
the weighting or aggregation problem is at, least as troublesome here as
elsewhere.
Second, in discussing the relation of investment to profit incentives,
Messrs. Hoover and Klein do not mention the factors —particularlylow
interest rates —whichmay in the postwar period tend permanently to raise
investment for a given level of income. The level of wage rates relative to
equipment costs and interest rates may operate in the same direction. How-
ever, since the authors apparently rely on norms based on profits before
taxes rather than after taxes as the basis for appraising the adequacy as wellSUMIMARY AND APPRAISAL 325
as estimating the leve' of profits, the factors which tend to raise postwar
investment for a given level of income may be 'more than offset by the
smaller profits after taxes now associated with given profits before taxes.
The paper by Albert R. Koch presents projections of the average capi-
tal expenditures and financial requirements of manufacturing corporations
as a whole under full-employment conditions for the years 1950-54, apply-
ing some of the procedures outlined by Messrs. Hoover and Klein. Aver-
age, high and low projections of outlays, profits, and internal and external
sources of funds are made in terms of average 1949 prices. Basically, these
estimates involve projections of historical relationships between each of the
different types of expenditures, internal financing and supplier credit on
the one side and projected full-employment sales on the other. After deter-
mining additional outside financial requirements by subtracting the indi-
cated sources from total uses, this capital demand is broken down into debt
and equity money so as to maintain the 1949 debt-to-equity ratio.
Mr. Koch has done a careful and valuable job within the limits of
available data, and he has taken pains to point out the many qualifications
of such an analysis. However, I should like to take issue with what is
probably his most important finding: that —underthe assumption of full
employment and maintenance of the historical relationships between sales
and investment, profitability and methods of financing—equityfinancing
through stock sales from 1950 to 1954 would have to be fairly significant
relative to the actual recent volume in order to maintain the 1949 debt-to-
equity relationship. My reservation is not that I necessarily consider this
incorrect, but simply that I have some doubts that, even granting all the
assumptions, our available data and knowledge are sufficient to lead to
such a conclusion with any degree of confidence.
Specifically, stock financing, which is essentially a residual in Mr.
Koch's estimation process, constitutes such a small proportion of total
sources or uses, and the margin of uncertainty in each of the other items
derived from historical relationships is so great, that I am far from certain
that any reasonably definitive statement of this type can be made. For
example, in deriving the "low" projection of the annual increase in cash,
it was assumed that cash would rise with sales to maintain the proportion
of cash to sales at the end of 1949, while the ratio of cash to salesin the
immediate prewar years (when cash was a higher proportion of sales) was
used in conjunction with the 1949 relation to obtain the "high" projection
of the annual increase in cash. Actually, the historical data which Mr. Koch
presents indicate a lower ratio of cash to sales in 1929 and 1937 —about
the same, incidentally, in both years —thanprevailed in 1949; and it
might be asked whether this ratio is not more appropriately used in deny-326 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
ing the low projection of cash rather than the one for 1949. Quite apart
from historical relationships, with their obvious limitations, the question
may legitimately be raised whether there was not excess liquidity at the
end of 1949.
Turning to the sources side, I shall bypass the difficulty of estimating
profits before taxes and simply comment on estimation of the portion of
such profits which would be retained. The projections assume that 40
percent of profits before taxes will be paid out as taxes and that two-thirds
of profits after taxes will be paid out as dividends. To indicate the nature
of the magnitudes involved, I might note that if the effective income tax
rate of all manufacturing corporations averaged 38 percent, the same pro-
portion as in the 1947-49 period, the need for $100 million to $200 million
of the projected stock sales per year would disappear. More important, if
the ratio of dividend payments to income after taxes were significantly
below two-thirds, e.g., 60 percent as compared to 48 percent in 1949 and
currently, all need for projected stock sales would disappear under Mr.
Koch's average uses and average internal sources of funds model. The
prewar ratios were 64 percent in 1929, 83 percent in 1937 and 55percent
in 1940.
Finally, I should like to point out that even if Mr. Koch's projections
are accepted, it appears that the lower range of his estimates of uses and
the upper range of his estimates of internal sources of funds would entirely
obviate the need for stock financing, though such a variant on the model
is not presented in the paper.
In spite of all their shortcomings, such projections, I think, serve a reaJ
use, not only in presenting a range of estimates which are internally consis-
tent and in reasonable accord with historical experience, but also in indi-
cating the areas which are particularly in need of further exploration.
FACTORS INFLUENCING MANAGERIAL DECISIONS IN DETERMINING
FORMS OF BUSINESS FINANCING
While the essay by Neil H. Jacoby and J. Fred Weston does not present any
new material on factors influencing managerial decisions in respect to
forms of business financing, it does presenthighly readable account of
the present status of knowledge, a suggested framework of analysis with
a useful classification of the factors involved, a discussion of specific
research areas and techniques, and some remarks on the relation of infor-
mation in this area to policy formation.
In one of the few instances where Messrs. Jacoby and Weston attempt,
on the basis of available information, to draw conclusions about the factors
that influence managerial decisions on financing forms, it seems to me thatSUMMARY AND APPRAISAL 327
there is some question about the inference they make. This occurs in their
discussion of Chudson's monograph on The Pattern of Corporate Finan-
cial Structure, in which an analysis of the rank correlations of the ratios of
long-term and short-term debt to total assets for the various minor indus-
trial divisions, and of long-term debt and capital stock to total assets,
showed no statistically significant relationship, inverse or direct. They state
that these observations have far-reaching implications, indicating an ab-
sence of substitutability between short-term and long-term debt, and
between long-term debt and capital stock. Though they later point out the
need for further testing, they make this tentative generalization: "One
possible inference from these conclusions is that the scope for the exercise
of managerial discretion in choosing between the major categories of
financing forms is limited, because a broad and pervasive set of exogenous
factors circumscribes the range of managerial discretion."
The relevance of the test to the conclusion seems to me doubtful. Thus,
a statistically insignificant correlation between the ratios of long-term and
short-term debt. to total assets for the different industry groups simply
implies that among industry groups there was no discernible relation
between the size of the two ratios. The more relevant question is whether
there was such a relation within industry groups, but I might note that even
if there was not, the conclusion that "the scope for the exercise of man-
agerial discretion in choosing between the major categories of financing
forms is limited" would probably still not be justified.
THE INVESTIGATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE FORM IN WHICH
FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE FOR BUSINESS INVESTMENT
While the preceding papers have stressed the need for additional research
on the characteristics of the supply of funds for business investment, with
specific reference to studies of financial standards of institutional suppliers
of funds, Homer Jones emphasizes that this should cover not only financial
institutions but also individual investors, both actual and prospective. A
survey indicating the factors influencing the amount of funds such persons
make, or would make, available for investment, particularly in equity form,
would be a real contribution, although admittedly a difficult project to
carry through. Mr. Jones refers in this connection to the pioneering work
of the Michigan Survey Center, but does not mention the earlier prewar
surveys carried out by the New York Stock Exchange.
Neither Mr. Jones nor this conference —perhapswisely in the present
stage of knowledge —haspaid much attention to the available material
relating to the problem of determining or projecting the over-all propensity
to save on the part of individuals, corporations or the economy at large,328 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
or to make available funds in different forms and under varying conditions.
However, it may be in order to comment briefly on the growing institu-
tionaJization of savings, with the resultant pressure on banks and insurance
companies to find investment outlets. Since, with minor exceptions, those
institutions do not buy common stock, there has been a steady growth in
the demand for fixed-interest-bearing obligations. The substantial demand
for corporate bonds by life insurance companies is particularly notable.
The current flow of funds into the private insurance field is three times the
average of the late 1920's. These companies alone bought on balance dur-
ing the past few years a volume of corporate bonds about equal to the total
increase in corporate bonds outstanding. Even more recently, attention has
been called to the prospective importance of the growth in private pension
plans.
I should like to indicate a caveat, which seems normally to be over-
looked, in projecting trends in the institutionalization of savings, particu-
larly as they relate to life insurance companies. From an estimated 0.8
percent in 1909, the ratio of saving in insurance to income increased to
1.7 percent in the late twenties and to 2.4 percent in the late thirties. The
ratio, however, has declined since that time and is currently 1.8 percent. In
the postwar period, saving in insurance also leveled off in absolute
amounts as a rise in benefits paid out on past insurance fully offset the
increase in new insurance.
COSTS OF DEBT AND EQUITY FUNDS FOR BUSINESS:
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT
The paper by David Durand deals primarily with the conceptual problems
involved in measuring the costs of debt and equity funds for business.
Though the author makes a number of challenging remarks and develops
some interesting hypotheses, I have the feeling that he tends first to under-
estimate existing theory and second, perhaps, to complicate unnecessarily
the conceptual problems.
In the first section of his paper, Mr. Durand states his "unorthodox"
position: that instead of maximizing income, the businessman should try
to maximize the discounted value of his future income. As Mr. Anderson
pointed out, this position is quite orthodox, and the injection of the ele-
ments of time preference, uncertainty and risk is in no sense inconsistent
with current economic theory, or different from present classroom practice
in corporation finance.
In the second section of his paper, Mr. Durand introduces and dis-
cusses at some length two methods of capitalizing earnings of a business —
inthe one case capitalizing net operating income, in the other net incomeSUMMARY AND APPRAISAL 329
—whichapparently are commonly used by security analysts. Presumably,
though the point is not spelled out, it is implied that a businessman con-
fronted with a financing decision also uses one or the other method in
maximizing the discounted value of his future income.
It is not clear from Mr. Durand's example why the two methods need
give different results. The substantially different results he obtains, with
the "radically different implications for financial policy," arise from the
use of the same capitalization rate, regardless of the stream of income
being capitalized and regardless of variations in risk as evidenced by dif-
ferent relationships. I see little reason for proponents of the
two methods to use the same capitalization rate or for the capitalization
rate to be independent of the proportion of bonds in the capital structure.
It seems to me more straightforward to assume that a businessman
would employ bond rather than stock financing whenever the difference
between the expected-earnings/price (or earnings net-proceeds) ratio and
the interest rate exceeds the risk differential as the businessman assesses
that risk. Allowing for corporate taxes, the expected-earnings/price ratio
should be compared with the interest rate times the complement of the
tax rate rather than with the interest rate alone. Presumably, abstracting
from a number of complications, stock financing would not be used except
where the expected rate of return on additional investment exceeds the
ratio of expected (per share) earnings on old investment to current price
(or expected net proceeds per share).
In this connection, I disagree with Mr. Durand's appraisal of the
hazard involved in the use of the difference between the stock earnings-
priceratio and bond yield as a measure of differential in "cost" between
the two forms of financing. It does not, as he states, imply wholehearted
acceptance of the net income method of valuation, but simply gives a
measure of the variation in risk differential as evaluated at the intersection
points of the supply and demand schedules of capital.
The basic limitations in attempting to draw any definitive conclusions
from the historical movements in the earnings-price ratio and bond yield
(adjusted for corporate taxes) are in my opinion not those cited by Mr.
Durand, but simply, first, the difficulty of deriving an expected-earnings/
price ratio from the actual data and, second, the difficulty of constructing
the supply and demand schedules fro.m their interseètions over time. It
should be noted that the higher level of debt financing at much lower inter-
est rates in the recent postwar period —ascompared with the twenties —
apparentlyimplies a substantial easing in the supply of senior money,
while the lower stock financing at somewhat higher earnings-price ratios
(assuming that the latter is an index of expected earnings-price'330 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
ships at comparable points in the cycle) implies a moderate tightening in
the supply of junior money. The latter, incidentally, might be explainable
either in terms of a different risk appraisal by suppliers of funds or by the
changes in effective personal tax rates paid by stockholders.
THE EFFECT OF THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND THE
TERMS THEREOF, ON BUSINESS INVESTMENT
There are two parts to the paper by Franco Modigliani and Morton Zeman:
first, a brief discussion of some theoretical aspects of the manner in which
interest rates and expected-earnings/price relationships affect both busi-
ness investment and a rational entrepreneurial choice between senior and
junior capital; and, second, a statistical test of the latter —namely,the
theory adduced to explain the relative demand for senior and junior capital
—againstover-all historical data from 1920 to date.
The element of novelty in the theoretical formulation appears to be
the attempt to incorporate the effects of uncertainty through the use of the
dispersion of anticipated earnings. As a consequence 'of some fairly restric-
tive assumptions, Messrs. Modigliani and Zeman arrive at an interesting
conclusion that "the optimum total amount of new financing is independent
of the risk aversion of the stockholders and of the form in which the financ-
ing is done." -
Thereasonableness of the assumptions seems to be questionable. I
doubt that for given expected average profits, risk is dependent solely, or
even primarily, on a measure of dispersion of such profits. For example,
I question whether risk remains unaffected for given expected •average
profits and dispersion regardless of the probability of a net deficit or the
possibility of bankruptcy. Moreover, the authors' empirical investigation
does not give any support to their theoretical analysis: their attempt to
introduce a particular measure of dispersion as an explanatory variable
for the ratio of common stock to total new capital issues not only leads to
insignificant results but, as they are careful to note, to results "contrary to
expectation."
The statistical relationships used to explain the historical fluctuations
in the relative demand for senior and junior capital are of interest apart
from the theoretical exposition of the influence of uncertainty. Unfor-
tunately, the coefficients of correlation obtained for the various hypotheses
tested by the authors are rather low especially when it is considered that
the extreme observation for the year 1929 tends to exaggerate the signifi-
cance of the expected-earnings/price ratio. In addition, questions might
be raised —asthe authors are well aware —concerningthe use of bonds
rather than debt (including bank loans) to represent senior capital, andSUMMARY AND APPRAISAL 331
about the aggregation problems involved in adding such groups as rail-•
roads together with other corporations. The ultimate question, of course,
is whether infact the observed points trace out a demand relationship (at
least in a substitution sense) —amatter that is open to some doubt.
I want to emphasize that from an a priori point of view I would not have
been startled by a reasonably close relationship between the relative impor-
tance of stock issues and the difference between expected-earnings/price
measures and the interest rate. I have in the past experimented with a
number of such measures but have uniformly been disappointed with the
results.
the analysis presented by Messrs. Modigliani and
Zeman, I might observe that from a behavioristic point of view there have
been several studies suggesting that fluctuations in the interest rate,
the moderate range to which we have become accustomed, seem generally
to have little effect on business investment, at least by fairly large, estab-
lished firms to which such capital is available on reasonable terms. More-
over, there is some indication that this may also be true for equity capital.
Thus, according to a recently published McGraw-Hill survey, business-
men indicated that a 50 percent rise in stock prices from late 1949 (to a
Dow-Jones industrial average not far from 300) would have little influence
on their investment programs. Such a rise under current conditions would
involve a reduction of the earnings-price ratio on stocks to a point as low
as or lower than that prevailing in the boom years of the twenties. Similarly,
according to preliminary results of a special survey of capital budgets,
carried on by the Department of Commerce as part of its joint program
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, changes in the availability
and cost of debt and equity capital since the beginning of 1949 have had
virtually no effect on investment programs for 1949 or 1950.
It has been suggested, however, that a form of capital rationing pre-
cludes access to capital for a large sector of the busines population, particu-
larly new and small businesses, which it is maintained cannot obtain funds
on virtually any terms, even where the contemplated investment may be
justified on the basis of objective, economic factors. In this connection, I
might mention that the Department of Commerce is now engaged in prepa-
rations for a comprehensive survey of the financial needs of business,
especially small business. This survey, the first of its type, will undertake
to provide quantitative information on the demand for both equity and
debt capital, and on the extent to which this demand remains unsatisfied
under present institutional and market conditions. An will be
made to appraise the financial position of firms seeking capital; and in the
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to be sound prospects, the factors which have prevented them from fulfil-
ing their needs for funds will be investigated.
In carrying out this program, questionnaires will be mailed to a large
sample of firms, to give adequate representation to companies of all sizes,
ages and geographical locations. The initial mailing, covering about 20,000
firms, will go only to manufacturing and trade firms, while service and other
industries will be reserved for subsequent surveys. Balance sheet and earn-
ings data will be obtained from a sample of the firms replying to the
questionnaire, and for part of this sample case studies will be made of
existing impediments to the fulfillment of their capital requirements. In
these case studies the prospective suppliers of capital will be approached
as well as the firms seeking funds.
While we have already laid out the general nature of the study —
includingthe sampling design —andhave drawn up tentative question-
naires, its adequacy will be tested on a small sample of 200 firms, half by
personal interview, half by mail, before the final form of this program is
determined.
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
It seems to me that this conference has raised the right questions and has
correctly depicted the present, admittedly unsatisfactory, state of our
knowledge. Some of the more important conceptual as well as. empirical
gaps have been suggested, and both work in progress and additional
research recommendations have been discussed, though by no means
exhaustively. For example, no. mention has been made of either the
National Bureau study of past and prospective capital requirements of the
economy as a whole, which was recently initiated, or of the Wharton
School study of characteristics of the over-the-counter securities markets
which is well under way.
The necessity of obtaining over-all data to provide a frame of refer-
ence, as against nonrepresentative sample information, has been pointed
out; but the fact that for meaningful analysis over-all data must be supple-
mented by industry, size, age and even by frequency distribution detail
has also been stressed. To the best of my recollection, no one was bold
enough to recommend regional detail at this point, but I trust that in some
future conference progress will have been sufficient to warrant such a
breakdown. Various procedures of analysis have been proposed, including
time-series analysis of aggregate data, cross-section analysis of aggregates,
and case studies covering the same firms for as extended periods as pos-
sible. .The suppliers of funds as well as the firms seeking funds have been
mentioned as potentially fruitful sources of data on business financing.SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL 333
I should like to underline a point suggested in several of the papers:
that it is necessary to obtain not only the reasonably objective financial
data now customarily compiled, but also through appropriate surveys to
collect information on the factors motivating business firms (and suppliers
of funds) in their financial decisions. Such information could hardly be
derived from historical data, partly because of shifts over time as well as
the limited number of observations. Cross-section data help, but they are
ordinarily far from sufficient for the purpose in the face of the extreme
company to company variability introduced. On the other hand, I should
not want to rely on survey information of the opinion poll type without first
confronting the answers obtained with the financial data of the particular
firm and, second, confronting the latter with the financial data of firms
generally.
Finally, it might be noted that one important body of data in the field
of business finance —stockmarket statistics —hasbeen very little touched
on during the course of this conference, in large part, I assume, as a
reaction against the high proportion of questionable and, from the point
of view of business finance, largely irrelevant analysis in this field. Yet
comprehensive study of the prices of equity securities of different groups
of firms, in different markets and, at different stages of. the cycle, and their
relations to earnings and dividends —withparticular emphasis on price
experience during the period of gestation of a new offering —isstill in
order, even in the wider perspective of business finance than that with
which stock market analysts have customarily been concerned. This is
only one of a number of possible examples to indicate that not only is
business finance an extremely promising field for further research but much
of the empirical data already available are still far 'from adequately
investigated.
REPLY
DAVID DURAND, National Bureau of Economic Research
In stating that it is "more straightforward to assume that a businessman
would employ bond rather than stock financing whenever the difference
between the expected-earnings/price (or earnings/net proceeds) ratio and
the interest rate exceeds the risk differential as the businessman assesses
that risk," Mr. Friend is begging the question, just as many previous writers334 RESEARCH IN BUSINESS FINANCE
have begged it. How does the businessman go about estimating this differ-
ential? That is the important issue.
At present, all we know is that risk exists and that businessmen are
aware of it; we do hot know how they actually estimate it. We may surmise,
however, that they use a variety of methods. Undoubtedly, some business-
men estimate risk by careful analysis based on economic considerations;
whereas others, finding such analysis too difficult, probably resort to whim,
prejudice,.or astrological advice. But even among those who use careful
analysis, there are bound to be differences of opinion concerning basic
methods, as well as differences in final conclusions. Thus, one careful
analyst may arrive at a high estimate of risk and recommend stock financ-
ing, while another, appraising precisely the same situation, may arrive at
a low estimate and recommend bonds.
If we are to understand financing practices, we must make a concerted
effort to learn the technical details of risk appraisal. The NOl method, to
which Mr. Friend takes exception, was introduced in my paper as a con-
crete example of one possible method by which a businessman might esti-
mate the risk differential between stock financing and bond financing. I do
not think that it is a good method, or that many businessmen use it. Never-
theless, it may be the best method we have at the present time, in which
case we clearly need to seek better ones. Our search will not be advanced
if we go no further than to say that businessmen estimate risk differentials
in ways known only to them.